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THE OPEN STATE AND THE IMPERATIVE 
OF FREEDOM
About Ernst -Wolfgang Böckenförde’s 
political philosophy (part I)





The liberal, secularized state lives on the basis 
of assumptions that it itself cannot guarantee. 
(E. -W. Böckenförde, 20162: 60).
There are concepts and realities that are almost a hermeneutical riddle 
and imply many and contrasting interpretations, often irreconcilable. 
Such is the idea or reality of the state, as a historical creation and also 
as an inevitable social and political entity.
Let us consider, just as an example, what Hegel says, according to 
K. G. von Griesheim’s Nachschrift: “God’s way through the world is 
what makes the State. It is the power of Reason that is realized as Will. 
[…] The State is not a pure work of art. It is in the world, in the sphere 
of arbitrariness, chance, error; a bad intention can disfigure it in many 
ways” (Hegel, 2000/2006: 618).
We see that Hegel insinuates the need and excellence of politics as 
a rational and practical intent but always incomplete, the will to pro-
mote and impose law in the concrete structures of collective life, to 
encourage freedom and justice; but he also stresses the insufficiency 
and fragility of such achievement in history.
Thus, the possibility arises of multiple and disparate accents (often 
negative) in the view of the State: as organization of a class that dom-
inates over others through conquest and subjection (thus for Franz 
Oppenheimer, 1922: 5); or as political instrument of power of a ruling 
class for the imposition of its interests, according to the Marxist vulgate 
(Klaus / Buhr, 1975: 1163). And the list could be extended.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL VALUES | VOLUME II | NÚMERO 2 | DEZ. 2019
34 | ARTUR MORÃO – MENDO HENRIQUES
Aware of the range and of the inevitable conflict of theories of state 
from Plato and Aristotle to M. Weber, C. Schmitt, J. Rawls, N. Luhmann 
and others, not to mention the 17th century and 18th century classical 
authors, we will address the political reflection by Ernst -Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, a German jurist. His ideas and concerns are most relevant 
today, as the moral assumptions of the liberal state are being ques-
tioned from within and from the outside: from within by populistic 
political parties, and from the outside by foreign powers. The multipli-
cation and consolidation of democracy was an obviously relevant pro-
cess of the 20th century; but we must take into account that democracy 
is a god that fails, if not sustained from within by citizens endowed 
with a firm belief in the imperative of freedom.
Böckenförde’s writings have been translated in the USA (1991) and, 
since 2000, in Italy, Spain, France and England. His work is becoming 
the subject of academic debate, inside and outside Germany, as regards 
legal and constitutional theory, the relationship between politics, law 
and bioethics; there is much to say about his influences and his intel-
lectual interlocutors such as Thomas Hobbes, G.W.F. Hegel, Lorenz von 
Stein, Hermann Heller and Carl Schmitt. It is predictable that the bib-
liography around his work will multiply.
One year after his death, among unprecedented world changes and 
huge uncertainties, it is relevant to revisit and evaluate his lasting con-
tribution. Here, our interest focuses exclusively on the notion of the 
State and some of its implications; we will leave for another paper his 
interpretation of the historical evolution of law and the Constitution, 
his position on issues of bioethics, and his vision of the European Union 
project and globalization.
1. E.W. Böckenförde’s questioning of the State
In an early essay entitled The birth of the State as a process of secularization 
(1967), which has elicited positive and negative reactions, Böckenförde 
enunciated a paradox that became famous: “The secularized liberal state 
lives on assumptions that it cannot guarantee”[without calling into ques-
tion its own liberal nature] (2016b: 60). The paradox assumes that 
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democracy is nourished by principles, purposes, and cultural and eth-
ical values  that abide in the citizens in view of mutual support, recog-
nition of peace, security and the expression of freedom as autonomous 
people; in other words, society lives from the consensus among citizens 
on common ideas and purposes to act in a solidarity way. On the other 
side, the liberal state cannot impose any ethos on its citizens; as a unit 
of power and decision, it must just enable personal life to go on, secure 
personal identities, guarantee peace and protection against violence, 
and ensure order of coexistence and grant concrete freedom; for with-
out freedom of action there is no law.
Böckenförde was a constitutionalist expert, a professor of Law and 
a Judge of the German Federal Court and his essays outline a clear and 
balanced notion of the State. As a political institution, he stressed, the 
State originated in modern Europe, and evolved into a rule of law and 
a democratic entity; therefore, what matters is not the State as an 
abstract greatness, but as a social organization in its concrete manifes-
tation, and with the structural and legal transformations that resulted 
in current democratic regimes.
There are several motives for paying attention to Böckenförde’s the-
ory of the state. First, as populistic and nihilistic trends grow in Western 
democracies, we need a renewed legitimation and justification of 
democracy, stressing that the ethical faith of democratic men and 
women is the key to overcome democratic inconsistencies.
We live in a complex situation in which the solution of old problems 
is often postponed, and new and unexpected ones are not tackled. The 
contemporary world presents dizzying challenges. Scientific and tech-
nological knowledge develops at such an intense pace and we are con-
fronted daily with an exponential growth of information on a global 
scale, with unforeseen consequences, and with the threats and dangers 
that may arise from the unregulated and anti -humanist use of technol-
ogy and ‘Big Science’
Issues such as identity and security, sustainability, multiculturalism 
and interculturality are at the heart of the political debate. The global 
and the local, the universal and the singular, tradition and modernity, 
short and long term in social and political decisions, competition, jus-
tice and respect for all, routine and progress, are in conflict in a very 
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convoluted world reality. Everything forces us to refuse already made 
recipes and hurried pseudo -solutions and requires us to think and cre-
ate a common emancipatory destiny.
Democracy lives an ambiguous condition. The Italian philosopher 
N. Bobbio, examining the disparity between the promises of democracy 
and its effective fulfilment, listed some unfulfilled aims (1997: 21 -33). 
The initial inspiration for democratic society was individualistic and, 
consequently, emphasized the intervention of singular wills. Democ-
racy, alas, has slid to the opposite pole: the politically relevant subjects 
are, increasingly, groups, organizations, corporate associations, unions 
and parties, and less and less individuals.
Instead of a more cohesive and more supportive society, committed 
to a community of destination, we have a centrifugal society, with 
many focuses of power, a polycentric society, entangled in cultural 
struggles and offering lifestyles and meanings of life which favour 
individual choice, but also generate perplexity and disorientation.
Representative democracy is centred in national interest, but interest 
groups tend to capture the general interest; the State, too often, limits 
itself to be a mediator between parties; in a neo -corporate society, solu-
tions of social conflicts no longer depend on political representation, 
but more and more on large organizations. Basically, they care about 
representing and defending interests, through inter -peer agreements, 
and neglecting the common good.
The formal aspect of democracy – such as elections and scrutiny 
by checks and balances – is certainly relevant, as it presupposes and 
enables the participation of all; but it does not mean that the oligar-
chic power infiltrated in the social fabric is eliminated. One should 
stimulate the education of citizens and combat the growing apathy 
of young people and raise groups, centres and movements with dif-
ferent objectives that lead to discussion and transparency. This will 
hamper the presence of occult powers (pressure groups, economic 
cartels, even mafias) and the spread of corruption among political 
elites.
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2. Law and freedom
At the end of his famous 1967 essay, The birth of the state as a process of 
secularization, Böckenförde asks. “Of what does the state live, where does 
it find the strength that sustains it and guarantees the homogeneity and intrin-
sic virtues that regulate freedom, which it needs, since for it the force derived 
from religion is no longer, nor can it be, essential?”(2016b: 59)?
In the old regime, before 1789, religion was a profound binding force 
upon the political order and state. The Western state, however, is not a 
universal concept; it is rather the result of a political metamorphosis, 
which took place between the 13th century and the end of the 18th 
century. It emerged out of a stormy secularization process – started in 
the 11th and 12th centuries (Question of Investitures, 1052 -1122) – lead-
ing to the emancipation of political order from traditional religious 
authorities and obligations.
Along such path, the process focused on the individual and his free-
dom, and culminated in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Cit-
izen. A question, alas, inevitably arises: how can we find a new 
homogeneity now, so that the State is not just an aggregate of selfish 
individuals, exposed to disintegration? The idea of  nation, with its 
concept of unity, was a principle of integration and a substitute for the 
old religious unity; it enriched and densified the State with emotional 
and existential content, making it a kind of sacred ‘secular’; it raised a 
“community of conviction” (Gesinnungsgemeinschaft), and inspired a 
form of homogeneity, of political nature (1999: 22).
Now, the individualism resulting from human rights, as they were 
conceived, not only liberates and emancipates the individual from reli-
gion, but also from the nation as a homogeneous force. K. Marx has 
made this reproach in the Jewish Question of 1843 – a formula that Böck-
enförde adopts and adapts up to a point. The state faces a threat of 
internal disaggregation. The rule of law (Rechtsstaatlichkeit) cannot 
renounce its liberal nature neither can it claim an organic uniformity, 
cohesion and wholeness as in totalitarian regimes. After Auschwitz, 
the state cannot engage in wars of religion, official ideologies; it cannot 
even revive the Aristotelian tradition of the polis neither and proclaim 
a system of objective values. Any of these setbacks would destroy the 
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imperative of freedom at its founding. The state is forbidden to go from 
1789 backwards, without annihilating itself as an order of personal 
freedom.
Now, if the State cannot rely on natural morality, imposed or regi-
mented, will it necessarily restrict itself to provide and satisfy the eude-
monistic expectations of its citizens? If the political foundation once 
resided in homo religiosus (in line with the horizon and the suggestion 
of political theologies), can it now focus on the homo hedonicus? Is there 
no more to guarantee than the satisfaction of personal desires? Do we 
have nothing but the exclusive promotion of “possessive individual-
ism” (Macpherson: 1962) to guarantee the harmony of freedoms and a 
certain consensus about values?
2.1 The image of man implicit in the legal system
Böckenförde’s analysis in his brief and dense essay The image of man in 
the perspective of the current legal system (1991: 58 -66), shows how society 
is implied in the prevailing law, and impregnated with Enlightenment 
principles; the legal order of Western democracies conditions and con-
figures our experiences and understanding of ourselves. Let us see 
some of the characteristics of this legal order.
a) We see the individual, based on the self, entangled in multiple social 
and community relations, but an entity endowed with a prior dignity 
and not an outcome of society. In this sense, the subject of the law is 
the mere individual, and not for example, the family or any kind of 
social group. Another person, another individual, a counterpart, does 
not appear as a condition, incentive and necessary partner for a true 
human existence, but only as a limit and barrier of particular legal 
freedom, whose rights must be respected.
b) Thus, there is no transcendental dimension; the individual with legal 
freedom emerges alone to seek, choose and, eventually, miss his des-
tiny. The basic content of rights does not provide an orientation for 
freedom; it does not indicate how to attain and realize its nature; it 
refers to freedom of religion, assembly, opinion, etc. “The law and the 
legal order guarantee only the condition of its possibility” (1991: 60). 
The law emphasizes subjective freedom in the sense of free choice and 
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specific emancipation; the ethical -moral contents are put in brackets as 
a blind content of the legal order that guarantees life, security and 
personal autonomy. There is no mediation between subjective legal 
freedom and the contents of its realization.
c) Current democratic constitutional order raises pluralism in world-
view and ethics as the core that legally structures public life. Concrete 
existence, thought and action thus refer to individual subjectivity, 
with scarce participation in the universal; the State becomes, basically, 
a means and instrument that preserves and enables the exercise of 
freedom.
The consequences are obvious: in the public sphere and collective 
life any common commitment may emerge as divisive, consensus is 
scarce and there is no unanimous orientation. The claim of truth of 
Christian faith appears, in this pluralistic context, only as one claim 
among others. As the basis lies in subjective freedom, there is, strictly 
speaking, objective content, but only the possibility of identifying, or 
not, such content. Certain aspects such as the respect for human dig-
nity and the fundamental right to life go beyond the guarantee of 
subjective freedom, but their meaning no longer depends on a horizon 
of truth, but on the consensus and the game of political powers, 
namely.
d) Considering the philosophical uncertainty about the dignity of man 
that is stated in the Constitutions of democratic regimes and the ‘mal-
leability’ of the law resulting from power games of political majorities 
and coalitions, there is another unwanted and perverse effect: “Current 
legal regulations – as a reflection of the growing social differentiation 
– refer, more and more and in general, to human beings no longer as 
people, but as certain roles and functions” (1991: 65). In other words, 
the instrumentalization of law prevails upon its fairness and rectitude; 
the essential fungibility of everyone is imposed and cultivated in the 
social sphere; only in privacy, as an active subject, can an individual 
consider himself a person. Now, is it possible for a democracy without 
democrats to persist, i.e. without people that deeply respect the other? 
Does not such democracy run the risk of becoming a scarecrow, unable 
to repel its inner adversaries and enemies from the outside?
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2.2 The mutuality of freedom and law
In his essay Freedom and Law, Freedom and State, Böckenförde turns to 
Kant, Hegel and (tacitly) the young Marx, as critics of the individualist 
anthropology underlying the Declaration of the Rights of Man (2016b: 
42 - 57).
a) There is a necessary conditionality of freedom and rights. A truly 
human life, therefore a free life, cannot be realized outside of an order 
with no legal form and shape; a world without law would be the realm 
of barbarism and pure arbitrariness. Anyway, freedom cannot be con-
ceived as an individual and absolute category, abstracting from the 
external world, which it needs for its fulfilment. Freedom must there-
fore be integrated into such an order, whose goal is also freedom. How 
does Böckenförde expands this argument?
Human relations are not exclusively of harmony and cooperation, 
but also of competition and conflict. Freedom demands law as a stabi-
lizing social structure and a condition of itself; normative regulation is 
imperative for establishing the scope and limits of the individual’s free 
activity. Without the law, there would be the triumph of the strongest. 
“Freedom has, and finds in the law, the form that enables and mediates 
it.” (2016b:43).
b) However, the mere existence of the law is not enough to achieve 
freedom. This must be the goal of the legal configuration; the law must 
contain it, because only when it becomes effective, beyond the neces-
sary condition of freedom, does it become a sufficient condition of 
freedom. (2016b:44)
There is, therefore, a mutuality of freedom and law: law is a condi-
tion of freedom and freedom is the objective of law. What freedom, 
though? If it is only subjective freedom – freedom of choice, negative 
freedom, freedom from restraints and impediments, absence of phys-
ical and psychic external coercion – then the law comes from outside, 
as a constriction. The content appears in article 4 of the 1789 Declaration 
of Rights (2016b: 45), that is, the selfish and isolated man, social monad, 
without knots and ties, as Marx had denounced in The Jewish Question.
The current climate of opinion holds freedom as individual’s self-
-determination, without coercion and constraints, a capacity to config-
ure a lifestyle; the law appears as something extrinsic, coming from the 
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outside and limiting. Actually, freedom and law have an intrinsic con-
nection. To be safe and secure, freedom must be formulated and recog-
nized as law. Without it, it doesn’t exist; the law establishes freedom 
by marking limits, which are imposed to guarantee the freedom of all.
The possibility of each individual being a person, with conditions 
for self -development, presupposes an intersubjective space. “Objective 
and subjective moments are, therefore, connected” (1999: 235). One 
should note the indispensable difference between objective freedom 
(freedom for), scope of the realization of the personal project, and sub-
jective freedom, necessarily within limits. The law does not only exer-
cise a function of delimitation in relation to the spheres of subjective 
freedom; it also serves to establish goals, the content of freedom and 
to frame interactions between individuals.
Two problems arise: What is the source and the certainty about 
man’s objective determination? Since the end of the 18th century, 
revealed faith and a metaphysical concept of human nature do not give 
guarantees, in spite of a proliferation of ideological, humanistic, liberal, 
socialist projects in the context of coexistence.
There is a second problem: What is the relationship between such 
content and subjective freedom in the current climate of carelessness 
and a certain “post -truth” and “culture of cynicism”, according to the 
relevant expression of Richard Stivers (1994: 169)? In a world where 
there are baseless and meaningless norms that, for instance, do not 
confront the traffic of human organs, of destructive weapons, of drugs, 
etc.; and everyday life seems to be reduced to an empty and inane 
search for power and satisfaction, how can we guarantee everyone’s 
freedom? How can the State proceed in the face of pluralism?
3. The democratic state, in its structure and purpose, as guarantor of 
freedom
3.1 State’s crisis or opportunity?
Böckenförde’s research occurs in the great tradition of the German 
Staatslehre, attentive to the nature and history of the State; to its consti-
tutional structure and its internal and external relations, taking place 
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within the scope of the nation -state, but extending to supranational 
institutions, namely the European Union. Associating the ethical-
-philosophical horizon with the legal -constitutionalist perspective, he 
never loses sight of the German fundamental law (23.05.1949) [Grundg-
esetz] under whose influence he interprets the function of law and eth-
ics in the State.
In the dense 1978 essay, Der Staat als sittlicher Staat, Böckenförde 
declares that it is necessary to think of the State as an ethical State, that 
is, “with a meaning that goes beyond mere functional value, with 
authority and responsibility” (2017: 29). The unexpected consequences 
of globalization and late -modern assumptions about individualism, 
created a crisis of the nation -State; and yet, the state means more than 
a national state, linked to culture, language, traditions and even reli-
gion; it cannot yield to substitute forces, such as the current populisms 
or to follow the whims of leaders or groups. An open state (Staatlichkeit) 
is required, which overcomes nationalist tribalisms, sensitive to the 
deep motivations of groups and people and attentive to the possibility 
of integrating them, in order to create peace and bring about the pos-
sible balance between different values, mentalities and worldviews, 
even antagonistic ones.
The mediation of the state between human beings and freedom is 
indispensable to democracy. It requires a relative ethical homogeneity, 
but no unanimity. Without a state, there would be no political moder-
nity, that is, a structure with the legal capacity to impose decisions and 
apply sanctions, able to defend individual coexistence, and to demand 
the recognition of parties involved in social and political processes.
The State is a peace unit (Friedenseinheit), for the resolution of con-
flicts between individuals or groups, through legally regulated proce-
dures; it is also a decision -making unit (Entscheidungseinheit) to carry 
out its peace mandate; and, subsequently, a power unit (Herrschaftsein-
heit) for the exercise of security and sovereignty as the holder of the last 
word (2017: 32ff.).
As a system of domination and governance (Herrschaftsordnung), as 
a normative instance for the coexistence of all, the state must combine 
the imperative of security with the imperative of freedom; this combi-
nation abides in specific social conditions and it must be legally 
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guaranteed and limited. “A ‘total’ freedom, without limit or restriction, 
means only the unlimited power of the strongest, the unrestrained 
performance of natural forces that bring inequality. Freedom for all 
stems only from the limitation of natural excess, the effective defence 
and custody of this limitation” (2017: 38). If necessary, this limitation 
may be enforced, with violence, against terrorism, for instance
The purpose (Um -willen) of the State – and the opportunity to inces-
santly reinvent and renew itself – is to restrict the predominance of 
private interests, though presupposing them as terms of its action and 
intervention. For the conservative and timorate observer, the neutral 
state appears as a political power closed to ethics; for the revolutionary 
and boastful activist, right or left, it is a deficiency of the state not to 
assume an ideology in order to fully protect people’s lives. The demo-
cratic and secular state, though, renounced the use of coercion in reli-
gious and moral matters, and defends freedom of conscience by 
declaring it inviolable in constitutional terms.
Böckenförde rejects the ideologically defined state; he wants a state 
marked by the ethos of freedom at two levels: that of guaranteeing 
external freedom and security in view of creating the conditions for 
the possibility of individual well -being; and a state that internally 
creates the opportunity for cultural and spiritual development. He 
quotes Lorenz von Stein: “Freedom is an effective freedom only for 
those who have their conditions, the possession of material and spir-
itual goods as a precondition for self -determination” (2017: 47). The 
State was not created and conceived to serve itself, but to serve the 
basic ends of human life, once external peace is guaranteed, culture is 
accommodated, and right is defended. Through rules, provisions and 
concrete measures, the state guarantees freedom to all in the name of 
inclusion, responsibility and values. These objectives are “the ethical-
-spiritual principle of the State, which establish its reasonableness and 
the character of general entity […] The principle of equality and legal 
subjectivity, that of the recognition and defence of the individual in 
his position as subject, in his peculiarity and uniqueness, are consti-
tutive prerequisites of the universality of the State.” (2017: 42).
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3.2 Purpose, scope and limits of the State
a) Let us also insist on the scope of the state organization and its respon-
sibility. It exists to defend and foster common interests, to safeguard 
fundamental rights, human dignity and freedom of conscience, to 
establish the conditions for the viability and opportunity of individual 
development for all. This is a minimal assumption, with restricted 
anthropological content, concerning the described imperatives. In the 
current condition of a “democratic rule of law”, of a secular and neutral 
persuasion, this is perhaps the core state ethics and the ethical state; after 
the process of secularization, we have no recourse to religion or meta-
physics as an agglutinating element or instance of intimate demand 
and universalization.
Böckenförde, in the wake of the social -democrat thinker Hermann 
Heller, insists on the relative homogeneity and commonality (Gemeins-
amkeit) of the state. Despite the echo of Tönnies and more obviously of 
C. Schmitt, to whom politics is above all authority, decision and will, 
Böckenförde opposes Schmitt: as there is no original community, homo-
geneity must have a laboratorial, building dimension. Some Hegelian 
ethics is active here, that is, the sharing of the subjective and the objective, 
a structure that unifies the different modes of practical reason. The state is 
not to be muddled with society; in the civil society predominate inter-
ests, individual arbitrariness and what Hegel calls mere subjectivity 
and “barbarous will” (1986: 51); the state must contain these dimen-
sions within the universal, although Hegel still uses a theological ref-
erence – nowadays inapplicable.
For Böckenförde, the State, ethical and rational in its constitutional 
foundation, in its function and in its exercise, in its decision -making 
power and domain (through parliaments, governments and courts), 
must create conditions so that formal freedom and substantial freedom 
come together to make their administration effective and include in 
their will (Staatswille) the principle of self -determination of individuals 
(2017: 43 -44).
Only then the capacity to legislate and the performance of governing 
will be seen by citizens as intrinsic and not imposed exclusively from 
outside. Otherwise, there is a gap between the political class – they, the 
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government and the deputies – and the political population, without 
achieving, not even aiming at the union of individual wills in general 
will – which constitutes the greatest legacy from Rousseau to democ-
racy in favour of citizenship.
The purpose of the State requires the participation of citizens in the 
construction of political objectives and the decision -making process. 
The liberal movement in the 19th century created the Constitutions as 
instruments for individual involvement in the formation of the general 
will, in rupture with the state order of the Old Regime. The legislator 
became the people, as the will of the State embraced the principle of 
self -determination. The appeal and vision for individual freedom and 
self -determination, alas, remains empty and formal, until public poli-
cies materialize their implementation. On the other hand, the existence 
of the regulatory State is a necessary condition, but not sufficient, for 
the realization of freedom. The great liberal illusion is to think that it 
is enough for the State to be a regulator; on the contrary: it has to create 
tools and measures to achieve its objectives, subjecting them to account-
ability procedures.
The purpose of the state is to promote the freedom of all; not to 
guarantee anyone’s happiness – a substantive content – but to define 
its conditions of possibility. Beyond the dimension of external free-
dom and security, and in addition to the sphere of the State of need 
and consensus, there is the sphere of cultural and ethical -moral free-
dom, of the self -realization of individuals. The State must contain in 
itself the moment of exteriority, the renunciation of violent interference 
in the subjectivity that must be defended and enabled; and it must 
contain the refusal to include subjective details in the general law of 
the common good. Its foundation, its leaven and its union lies in the 
law, that is, in the recognition of individual autonomy (2017: 52 -53; 61 
and 69).
b) It is now relevant, as an epilogue, to envisage the scope and limits 
of state action. The first obligation of the state, as a state of necessity and 
consensus (Not - und Verstandesstaat), is the creation of formal peace, 
containing violence and limiting selfishness, ensuring external freedom 
and security, avoiding civil conflict, in order to provide substantial 
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peace as a space for the realization of lifestyles and the needs of human 
nature. The state must be prepared to respond to threats, external or 
internal (terrorism, agitation of radical forces, populist harassment, 
invasions etc.), which democracy cannot yield to, even if it has resource 
to force.
The state, in the perspective of Böckenförde, attentive to the tradi-
tion of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel, presents itself as a 
unit of conflict resolution, through decision and power in which dom-
ination and freedom are articulated. It exercises sovereignty in the con-
frontation between individuals or groups of citizens who claim rights, 
in order to defend common interests and impose the respect and inclu-
sion for all, and not just for some; in doing so, it fulfils political func-
tions and, in addition, ethical functions. (2017: 49).
A question then arises, related to the famous dilemma – “the secu-
larized liberal state lives on assumptions that it cannot guarantee”. Can the 
state have competences and exercise functions in the sphere of the sub-
stantial and objective orientation of freedom? Can it instil a shared 
inner conviction as a spiritual principle of legitimation? In the light of 
the surprising evolution of the democratic and social state, and faced 
with the horrors of totalitarian historical experience in the 20th century 
– Auschwitz never again – democracy has learned to make room for 
fundamental principles and values  in which the will of the state is self-
-limiting, and thus, to make room to human person.
The state cannot propose a system of mandatory values  with legal 
validity, a political faith; it would be more an ideology fed by the state, 
as it happened in totalitarian regimes. If that were the case, we would 
have a state political ideology (2017: 52 -53) and the total denial of the 
functional neutrality of the state, of its open status.
After the process of secularization, Christianity became one religion 
among others in civil society. Situated among multiple conceptions of 
the world, the modern state renounces the single thought, a unitary 
faith or worldview. It is incumbent upon it to prevent the unifying 
function of religion from being replaced “by the (imposed) unity of 
thought or worldview” (2017: 61 -63). Its task is to protect, guarantee 
and support, it is not constitutive or foundational; it should not, by its 
decision, fix the basic ethical -spiritual attitudes and convictions.
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The example of the democratic state to guarantee and promote 
human rights must come from within. The procedure of sovereign bod-
ies will not be guided by the principle of achieving maximum profit 
with minimum commitment; everything goes wrong when the state 
fails to promote civil virtues in public institutions and in its own 
actions. The state has a duty to guarantee and protect the development 
of life and cultural activity, without privileges or exclusive domains, 
as free processes in which individual conscience expresses itself. Its 
vitality, even more in times of change and uncertainty like ours, and 
its opportunity to assert itself, lies in nurturing with transparency and 
integrity the cultural and ethical assumptions that encourage citizens 
to support each other and recognize values that allow the freedom of 
each and everyone.
In the face of the intense pluralism Böckenförde repeatedly denounced 
the materialistic and pragmaticist myopia of today’s society, and some 
philosophical misanthropies (post - and transhumanism). As regards 
the perhaps irreversible crisis of the notion of political autonomy, trig-
gered by the processes of globalization, Europeanization and individ-
ualization, his judgment and appeal to humanism disturbs factual 
powers. He wrote: “A state devoted to the individual’s freedom and 
self -realization finds its reference in the formation and awakening of 
the humanum, in the person who has the power to express a judgment 
and to self -fulfil in accordance with reason – in a person who, before 
the spiritual and social environment, serves the community at the same 
time as he develops his identity. This is the essential legacy of Human-
ism” (2017: 64 -65).
The famous constitutionalist philosopher wanted to renew the 
state’s concern for freedom, based on law, justice and the promotion of 
the individual’s ethical -spiritual spontaneity, within the community. 
The state sustains, regulates and conditions, but does not grant or offer 
any foundations; so as is vacuous and sterile the wild individualism 
that surrounds us. Have we, then, a state baseless and “suspended in 
the air” (2017: 71)?
Again: despite criticisms, some of them very harsh, Böckenförde 
saw no reason to reject his theorem: “The liberal, secularized state lives on 
the basis of assumptions that it itself cannot guarantee” (2017: 70).
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